Government Growth and Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures

Author: Malhotra, Neil

Source: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Volume 31, Number 4, November 2006 , pp. 563-584(22)

Publisher: Comparative Legislative Research Center, The University of Iowa

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Abstract:

This article analyzes the professionalization of American state legislatures since the 1960s and expands on previous studies by considering the strategic incentives of members. Fiorina and Noll's (1978a, 1978b) theory that reelection-minded legislators serve as "ombudsmen to the bureaucracy" on behalf of their constituents suggests that legislatures have professionalized in response to growth in public spending in order to strengthen members' abilities to handle increased facilitation duties. I used longitudinal analysis and instrumental variables regression to test this hypothesis and disentangle causal directionality, since professional legislators may have the means and incentive to spend more than their citizen counterparts. Both methods revealed empirical support for the Fiorina and Noll hypothesis that spending increases caused legislators to become more professional.

Document Type: Research article

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